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Abstract 
The EU suggests that it is committed to ‘sustainable development’ including through its 
institutionalized relationship with the states of the African, Caribbean and Pacific group of 
states in the Cotonou Partnership Agreement.  This paper reviews this relationship with a view 
to outlining the way in which concepts like ‘sustainable development’ and ‘poverty reduction’ 
act as legitimation for processes of world market expansion.  The paper reviews a range of 
interpretations of this relationship which view it either from a constructivist or material – 
Uneven and Combined Development perspective.  We critique these interpretations and 
provide an alternative materialist reading. 
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Introduction 
This paper seeks to locate the EU’s Sustainable Development Agenda, and it’s position within 
the ‘post-2015 Consensus’ within an analysis of neo-liberalisation of EU external relations. 
We argue that a specific focus on the EU’s relationship with the African, Caribbean and Pacific 
(ACP) group exemplifies a multi-scalar project of neo-liberalisation, in which the discourse of 
sustainability is married to mechanisms that seek to manage the process of world market 
expansion within state-society complexes throughout the Global South and, simultaneously, 
the EU. In doing so we explore the range of alternative readings of the EU-ACP relationships 
and the wider literature on EU external trade. 
 
The contribution of the paper is two-fold.  We seek to place the EU-ACP relationship in a wider 
analysis of ‘sustainable development’, in line with the theme of this special issue, where 
sustainable development is located in a wider critical analysis of its relation to neo-
liberalisation.  Second, we offer a novel interpretation of EU-ACP trade liberalisation which 
acknowledges the contributions of the major interpretations of the relationship from realist, 
constructivist, neo-Gramscian and Uneven and Combined Development (U&CD) perspectives. 
However, by contrast, our interpretation rests on the location of these contributions in a wider 
understanding of world market expansion, and the politics of generalised competitiveness that 
is associated with this. The originality of our approach is to suggest in relation to realists, neo-
Gramscians and promoters of U&CD, that the EU-ACP trade relationship should not be read 
merely as the EU securing competitiveness relative to the ACP.  Our contribution relative to 
constructivists is to acknowledge the role of ideas but to suggest that these are important only 
in as much as they arise from material processes and have material affects, in this case, 
principally world market expansion and generalised competitiveness.  The significant 
implications of this are wide ranging and discussed briefly in the conclusion, but are of 
importance to those wanting to contest what they see as the damaging social, political and 
economic effects of trade liberalisation in both ACP and EU societies.  The discussion is 
therefore based on an interpretation of policy documents and a critique of the relevant 
secondary literature. 
 
The paper proceeds in four main parts.  The first explores the EU’s Sustainable Development 
Agenda and the centrality afforded to market-led strategies and in particular trade 
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liberalization.  The second documents the evolution of the EU-ACP relationship in the form of 
the Cotonou Partnership Agreement (CPA). The third explores the links between sustainable 
development and the Cotonou Partnership Agreement and the fourth examines a range of 
explanations for this relationship, identifying their weaknesses and advancing our own 
interpretation.   
The EU’s sustainability agenda 
The EU has a long-standing policy commitment to ‘sustainable development’ running as far 
back as the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam, Article 1 of which committed the EU and its member 
states to ‘promote economic and social progress…taking account of the principle of sustainable 
development and within the context of the accomplishment of the internal market and of 
reinforced cohesion and environmental protection and… ensuring that advances in economic 
integration are accompanied by parallel progress in other fields”.  It was also central to the 
much vaunted, if failed, Lisbon Strategy1 and the current Europe 2020 strategy for sustainable 
and inclusive growth,2 and more recently still to the EU’s engagement with the UN’s 
renegotiation of the Millennium Development Goals into the Sustainable Development Goals.3  
A full review of these strategies is neither possible or necessary here; we offer instead just a 
brief identification of the six key features of the EU’s engagement with sustainable 
development as a general objective throughout this period, and which, we argue, are broadly 
reflected in its relationship with the ACP.  Beyond the long-standing nature of this 
commitment, the further five features are: 
1. The commitment to securing sustainable development has long been seen as central to 
the EU’s external relations with other states, and in particular with developing 
countries4. 
2. The commitment to sustainable development is pursued in partnership with a range of 
inter-connected international organisations, including the Bretton Woods 
organisations, the WTO, the OECD and the UN5.  The EU’s institutional relations with 
the ACP group; partly a legacy product of formal 16th-19th Century imperialism, offers 
the EU an important strategic role in this partnership. 
3. Through these external relations with ACP states and partnerships with international 
organisations, as well as its own internal reform processes, the EU’s commitment to 
sustainable development is universal; being applicable to all societies at all 
development levels, characterised by ‘shared responsibility, mutual accountability and 
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engagement by all’.  Such universality is then inherently multi-scalar, linking local 
communities to the national, macro-regional and global levels. 
4. The approach taken to sustainable development is market based and predicated on 
‘Private Sector Development’.  The central thrust of sustainable development is to 
create and secure the conditions for increased trade, investment and economic growth.6   
5. Sustainable development then is about the promotion of world market expansion, both 
intensively (market deepening) and extensively (market broadening), and within both 
the EU and the wider world.  The promotion of world market expansion then requires 
trade liberalisation externally and internally, and domestic policy reform to secure 
generalised conditions of competitiveness and to cope with the domestic effects of this. 
 
As other authors point out, this way of framing of ‘sustainable development’ as a continuation 
of pre-existing economic growth strategies is contradictory7 or a wholly neo-liberal construct.8 
As Wanner9 notes, when arguing in similar terms about the current popularity of ‘green growth’ 
as an extension of sustainable development, what is actually being sustained is a process of 
neo-liberalisation.  Of course this sort of analysis might easily be seen to support the notion 
that politically mobilised concepts such as sustainable development – and add to that ‘inclusive 
growth’, ‘poverty reduction’ – are powerful in and of themselves.  Through showing the 
connection between the sustainable development understanding of EU external relations and 
the EU-ACP relationship we wish to show that ideas like this are significant, but only in as 
much as they are located in, and shape, material processes.  As such, we argue that sustainable 
development as carried through the EU-ACP relationship, should be read as a component of 
the material process of world market expansion.  The need to frame such a material project in 
more amenable terms – such as sustainable development – may always be present but is 
particularly acute at a time when the risks to world market expansion, from environmental 
degradation, natural disasters and socio-political tensions associated with poverty and 
inequality, are most apparent.10  It is in this context that the EU-ACP relationship can be 
viewed. It represents the longest –standing development cooperation between the EU and 
countries in the Global South and has come under continual pressure for liberalisation, 
particularly from the 1990s onwards. Those pressures are now framed as being in line with 
broader ‘sustainable development’ commitments. 
 
Attempts to engender ‘sustainable development’ and secure trade liberalisation however are 
often not successful as blanket policies or through one-size-fits-all institutions. Classic 
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examples here are the substantively stalled WTO world trade negotiations or the failure of 
structural adjustment policies in the 1980s/90s.  Rather policy frameworks to secure world 
market expansion and the consequent neoliberalisation require sensitivity to localised 
institutional, political, social and economic forms.  Without this, reform might easily cause 
economic collapse or political back-lash, as in the case of the structural reforms promoted 
under the ‘Washington Consensus’ of the 1980s/early 90s.  As such, agents promoting world 
market expansion are required to both cut across scales and to pursue reform in ways that 
recognise the need for localised and path dependent change.  It is this that causes scholars such 
as Peck and Brenner to focus on the ways in which neoliberalisation operates differently at 
multiple scales11 (i.e. as a multi-scalar process) and in ways that cuts across scales through 
institutional mechanisms (ie as both inter-scalar and trans-scalar, in the latter case where it 
jumps over an intervening scale, such as where international organisations bypass the domestic 
state and engage directly with sub-state actors). They also call attention to the ways that 
neoliberalisation, as a process, is an ongoing and variegated political programme.12 It is in this 
context that we explore and undertand the evolution of the Cotonou Partnership Agreement 
(CPA).  
The evolution of the CPA since 2004 
The EU has maintained an institutionalised relationship with the states of the African, Pacific 
and Caribbean group of states since the 1960s in the form of the Yaoundé and Lomé 
agreements.  The Lomé relationship was reflective of a post-independence and paternalistic 
relationship between the EU and ACP, characterised by a broadly Keynesian approach to 
managed development. The Lomé conventions provided non-reciprocal trade preferential 
access for ACP goods to the EU market, commodity stabilisation measures to offset market 
volatility and development aid based initially on grants. Essentially Lomé embodied some 
elements of the collective demands of newly independent developing countries in the 1970s, 
as expressed, for instance, in the demands for, and declaration of, a New International 
Economic Order.  By contrast Lomé’s replacement; the CPA – which was negotiated in the 
latter half of the 1990s – represented a clear attempt  to ensure that the EU-ACP trade 
relationship became WTO compliant and in line with broader neo-liberal reforms.13 
 
The CPA, incorporating the expanded membership of the EU and the now 79 ACP member 
states, provided a framework for the relationship for the new millennium. The geographical 
expansion of the range of the partnership means that taken together this represents a majority 
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of states within the United Nations and a total population of some 1.5 billion people,14 
including most developing countries.15  The explicit aim of the CPA is to tackle poverty, create 
economic growth and develop governance, via 3 pillars of cooperation on (1) development, (2) 
political and economic reform; and (3) trade.  It is funded by the European Development Fund 
(EDF), with ACP countries also receiving funds directly from the EU budget. The 11th EDF 
for the period 2014-2020 is €30.5 billion. The CPA entered into force in April 2003 and was 
revised in 2005 and 2010.16  In 2010 it was extended to incorporate new areas of climate 
change, food security, regional integration, state fragility, aid effectiveness, and importantly 
migration. 
 
Much focus has been placed on the prioritisation of increased reliance on the private sector, 
and encouragement for ACP states to create enabling environments and conditions for private 
sector growth. As a corollary, the discourse of sustainability, codified in the 2015 Sustainable 
Development Goals, has been reframed as ‘inclusive and sustainable growth’ through private 
sector development and regional integration.17  The provision of PSD funds which accompany 
the EPAs are regarded as a catalyst to unlock private finance, although the Commission does 
envision the private sector operating in tandem with ‘social, traditional and cooperative forms 
of economy’.18 
 
The prioritisation of private sector development reflects ongoing attempts to embed global 
market integration in path-dependent ways and increasingly sophisticated inter-scalar linkages 
between the EU and sub-regional, national and sub-national interests in the ACP.  Through this 
there is a common tendency toward the creation of an attractive investment climate for capital, 
the provision of an infrastructure to valorise that capital and sufficient protections in the rule 
of law to ensure that surpluses can be realised: 
‘Private financial flows, like remittances, foreign investments and finance 
from institutional investors, are already larger than all public resources 
combined. To fully capitalise on the potential of the private sector it is 
necessary to create enabling conditions for private initiative, trade and 
finance, for sustainable investments and decent employment creation, and to 
bring informal activities into the formal sector. It also requires a strong 
commitment by companies to catalyse private sector investment in areas 
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where market gaps exist and to engage in responsible practices as part of 
their core business strategies.’19 
Central to this has been the substantive shift from Lomé’s non-reciprocal preferential trade 
regime between the EU and the ACP as a block of countries to a series of reciprocal, WTO 
compliant Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs), based on regional groupings. The EPA 
negotiations began in 2002, and were due to be concluded by December 2007 however the 
process proved to be more difficult and lengthy than expected. Only the Caribbean region was 
able to meet the deadline, while, as we predicted in 200420 the negotiations with other regional 
groupings proved difficult. Moreover a coalition of resistance emerged (encompassing EU and 
ACP member states, civil society activists and NGOs) that challenged the liberalisation agenda 
on the basis of the potential threat it posed to the development of ACP economies, though the 
Commission continues to downplay these concerns.21  
 
In the face of a lack of progress, inertia and dissent, ‘Interim Agreements’ were proposed and 
in some cases agreed. In 2011 the EU was able to leverage its position by threatening to 
withdraw preferential market access to the EU for any state that had not concluded and ratified 
an interim EPA. While trade with ACP countries represents only a small proportion of EU 
imports and exports, the EU is a major trading partner for ACP countries, being the main 
destination for its agricultural and manufactured products. The deadline of October 2014 was 
set for countries to either sign an EPA, fall under one of the new Generalised System of 
Preferences (GSP) schemes, or have no trade preferences at all.  By the end of 2014 full or 
interim EPAs had been concluded with all 7 regions: West Africa, Central Africa, Eastern and 
Southern Africa (ESA), Eastern African Community (EAC), Southern African Development 
Community (SADC), the Caribbean, and the Pacific. The negotiations were concluded in the 
face of stalled multi-lateral trade liberalisation via the Doha Round, and at a time when the 
central role that the EU plays in ACP has been challenged by Brazil, China and India which 
are ‘strategically positioning themselves in these regions with an increased presence, growing 
investment and trade relations, and a growing cooperation portfolio’.22 
 
Through the reformulation of the relationship the EU has been able to fashion new trade 
relations with the ACP that are fully WTO-compliant, covering ‘substantially all trade’ 
(approx. 80%) in goods and services, investment and trade-related rules. The current 
agreements fall into three categories: Comprehensive Agreements that cover trade in goods 
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and in services, and agreement on other trade related measures; Goods Only EPAs that cover 
only the trade in goods but with ‘rendezvous’ clauses to extend the remit of the agreement; and 
interim Goods Only EPAs that cover only goods at present while ongoing negotiations for 
Comprehensive EPAs continue. The trade pillar of the EU-ACP relationship has been 
fundamentally transformed into a multi-pronged relationship with a variety of sub-regional 
groupings, better able to deal with variation in regional, sub-regional and national conditions. 
The rationale that underpins these reforms is explicitly framed in terms of ‘sustainable 
development’, based on regional integration to foster gradual integration into the world 
economy and the diversification from primary production to manufacturing.  
 
While these relationships provide for reciprocal free trade and fully liberalised access to EU 
markets, they also allow for a transition period for the ACP states to adjust to liberalisation via 
protection of sensitive sectors.  This enables legacy social and institutional structures to adapt 
to the pressures of competition in the world market and helps to offset (in theory at least) the 
scope for opposition. The Commission therefore rebuts claims about the coercive nature of EU 
– ACP relations by arguing that ‘EPAs respect national sovereignty – instead of imposing 
development strategies, EPAs ask countries to determine their own development strategies and 
the pace and sequence of reforms’.23  Similarly, it points to the collaborative nature of the 
associated aid programmes, which it argues are created through dialogue with the recipient 
countries, allowing them to be tailored  ‘to local needs and circumstances’.24 
 
Reciprocal but asymmetric arrangements are fully compatible with rules of the World Trade 
Organisation and allow for differentiation by taking into account the socio-economic 
circumstances of the partners. The concept of differentiation, including the targeting of both 
resources and particular trade provisions at the poorest and most fragile states, is one of 4 key 
principles of Agenda for Change that underpin the EU’s poverty reduction and sustainable 
development strategies. This requirement reflects the heterogeneity of the ACP Group whose 
membership ranges from middle-income countries to least developed and fragile states.  
Differentiation therefore is designed to cope with such variety, with the EU advocating 
‘graduation’ from bilateral development for the more developed states.25 The EU therefore not 
only advocates EPAs as inter-scalar institutional connections to secure differentiated pathways 
toward liberalisation, but also recognises this requires variegated institutional arrangements 
too. 
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The need to accommodate ACP LDCs within these new arrangements might appear 
unnecessary, as the EPAs seem to add little to the existing trade arrangements that they have 
with the EU. All LDCs already have duty free access to the EU via the ‘Everything But Arms’ 
scheme, however the Commission argues that their inclusion in the EPAs offer additional 
benefits. These include more flexible rules of origin; cooperation on trade related issues such 
as technical barriers to trade and improved infrastructure; enhanced regional markets and rules 
via integration projects; the safeguarding of local economies and prevention of trade disruption 
via gradual liberalisation and the embedding of relations within a ‘partnership of equals’ that 
cannot be altered without mutual agreement (in contrast to the EBA which is ‘granted’ by the 
EU). 
 
Alongside differentiation, the principles of coordination, concentration and coherence are key  
elements in the alignment of the EU’s poverty eradication and sustainable development 
strategies with the broader liberalisation agenda. This is further evidenced via the negotiation 
and conclusion of a variety of agreements that both complement and extend each other. For 
example, the EPA negotiations, have been accompanied by the development of broader 
strategic partnerships, such as the Africa-EU strategic partnership, the Joint Caribbean – EU 
Partnership Strategy, and the strategy for a strengthened partnership with Pacific Islands. The 
Africa-EU Partnership integrates those African sub-Saharan countries that have been part of 
the Lomé/Cotonou relationship with Northern African countries, which are not part of CPA. 
The Cotonou and EPA processes then offer overlapping and inter-scalar mechanisms for tying 
varying trade liberalisation and sustainable development projects together; not in a neat and 
hierarchically ordered fashion but in a complex network of agreements and financing projects. 
 
Heron and Murray-Evans26 argue that the outcomes of the EPA negotiations so far are ‘sub-
optimal’ in terms of the EU Commission achieving its original aims and subsequent attempts 
to expand the remit to of the agenda to include Trade in Services and ‘Singapore Issues’ such 
as ‘behind the border’ regulations in product markets and other public service provisions. 
Moreover, they point to the numbers of ACP states that have not signed the EPAs, and are 
instead linked to the EU via the ‘Everything But Arms’ Initiative or the Generalised System of 
Preferences. They attribute this the Commission’s failure to operationalise its ‘market power’ 
in the face of challenges and contestation from a coalition of support for the ACP. 
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However, this assessment underplays the achievements of the process so far. The seven EPA 
agreements that have been negotiated provide a framework for a 35 year process of gradual 
liberalisation which allows for the slow social, institutional, economic, political adjustment to 
full integration into the world market. While some of the agreements are not yet 
‘comprehensive’, they contain provisions for the ongoing negotiation of the depth and range 
of the agreements. As such, the current agreements will be subject to ongoing reform and 
change rather than being an end point. Furthermore, the provisions that allow for differentiation 
provide for the sequencing of these reforms and timescales, and agency for the ACP states 
within these decisions.   Those ACP states that are not currently signatories are included in 
these ongoing negotiations, whilst having their relations with the EU secured via other 
institutional provisions and regional arrangements, such as the Africa-EU Partnership. Finally, 
while the constitution of the regional EPA associations are still under construction, the EPA 
process has provided a mechanism for the sub-division of the ACP into smaller, and more 
manageable negotiating partners.   
 
In these ways, the EPAs establish pathways of future reform for world market expansion, 
taking account of the need for this to respond to scalar differentiation.  While the EU’s 
development policies, like other aspects of EU meta-governance27 frequently fail, this then 
provides the self-reflective logic for further policy experimentation and reform. In that sense, 
attempts at inter-scalar neo-liberalisation ‘fail forward’.28  Within this process, the EU has 
demonstrated some degree of relative autonomy, through its leadership and preferences for 
wide scale liberalisation and the expansion of the negotiating agenda, despite the expressed 
opposition by certain member states. Its aims reflect a wider institutional agenda, in line with 
other institutions of global governance. 
Interpreting the ACP-EU relationship 
There is a growing body of literature on the EU-ACP relationship.  A range of debates are 
present, for instance about whether the CPA marked an essential break29 or continuity30 in the 
EU-ACP relationship, around the generally unequal nature of the partnership,31 about the 
overall effectiveness of the relationship in generating economic growth and poverty reduction 
32. There are four main rival critical interpretations of the relationship.  The first sees the EU-
ACP as predominantly a social construction, where key concepts such as ‘partnership’, poverty 
reduction, democratisation, and now, we might add; sustainable development, are infused with 
power relations to lock in the ACP to a dependent form of development.33  The second, third 
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and fourth perspectives proceed from shared materialist foundations either in the quite different 
Gramscian,34 U&CD,35 or realist36 traditions – which nevertheless see the ACP as subject to an 
unequal power relationship with the EU in which they are once again locked in to an ongoing 
relationship of inequality. 
 
 The basic unevenness in the EU-ACP relationship is featured in a range of analytical accounts.  
Carbone argues that 10 years on from the beginning of the Cotonou agreement ‘despite its 
emphasis on partnership, the patterns of asymmetrical relations of the previous century have 
been reinforced’37. Hurt drew on an explicitly Gramscian analysis of material coercion and 
consent which undermined the idea of partnership and pointed to the manner in which the EU 
sought to ‘externalise’ responsibility for reciprocity by pointing to the pressures from the 
WTO.38  Carbone concurs, arguing the ACP’s capacity to shape policy outcomes has been 
limited. ‘The negotiations of the EPAs, of course, show that the ACP has somehow managed 
to resist the EU’s agenda. But in general, the objective conditions in which ACP states find 
themselves place them in a weaker position. Moreover, the asymmetrical relationship has been 
strengthened by the EU’s actions deconstructing the ACP Group and undermining ACP Group 
solidarity’.39 He argues that the promotion of norms appears paternalistic, with a gap between 
rhetoric and reality. 
 
The constructivist line of argument associates EU trade policy with a broader projection of 
normative liberal goals in shaping world politics and the global economy.40  While some 
constructivists share the liberal institutionalist perspective on the  expansion of European ideas 
as benign, more critical constructivists identify the way liberal ideas are used to pursue and 
veil particular interests.41  They identify multiple competing liberal goals which result from 
internal interests shaping EU external policy. These partly contradictory liberal objectives then 
locate the site of social struggle in the construction of the idea of Europe, and European external 
policy.42  Critical constructivists emphasise a ‘new trade politics’43 where the EU seeks ‘deep’ 
trade agenda of domestic reform in developing countries, often locking them in – through 
reciprocal free trade agreements to patterns of development likely to promote European 
‘values’.44  Indeed, Langan45 shows how these normative European values in trade/aid 
partnerships with developing countries are often loudly trumpeted but subordinated to the goals 
of competitiveness at the point of implementation. 
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Many of these constructivist accounts of the EU-ACP trade relationship closely resemble our 
own depiction. For example Storey locates our earlier analysis46 within his analysis of a 
normative Europe and its diffusion of ‘a particular and controversial `norm’ of economic 
governance’.47 Langan too shows how EU external trade – including with the ACP – is used to 
drive a particular ‘moral economy’ in the ACP which suits the interests of EU capital, and is 
only thinly veiled by legitimating norms of rights, democratisation and poverty reduction.48  
Constructivist accounts however reject a materialist analysis due to its prior analytical focus 
on material as opposed to ideational processes.49 
 
By contrast, Andreas Bieler50 argues that the EU-ACP relationship should be seen through a 
primarily materialist lens. He argues that EU external trade should be understood within the 
Global Europe strategy whose objective is to ensure the unequal competitiveness of EU 
produced commodities relative to those produced elsewhere. So the EU intends to lock ACP 
states into an uneven but combined trading relationship whereby dependence on EU markets 
for primary commodities is matched with imports of EU services and manufactured goods.  
This relationship also helps to offset claims for transnational working class solidarity on the 
grounds that workers and trade unions in the EU are placed in a contrasting material position 
to those in the global south.  This approach partly speaks to the demands set out by Will Brown 
for an understanding of the relationship between ‘western’ and African states that 
simultaneously asserts the unevenness of bargaining relationships between different states and 
looks for the uneven and combined nature of societal differences and connections between very 
different forms of state/society relationship.51 Brown therefore advises caution in relation to 
big picture analyses which suggest an internally coherent and universal tendency among 
international actors seeking reform in African states or, the universal application of reform in 
these states without considering the specific difficulties of this process inside very different 
state-society relationships. It is necessary therefore to give space for different non-market and 
pre-capitalist forms of power within African states which have often frustrated the liberal 
reform efforts of international organisations.52  For Brown, this critique extended to our own 
earlier analysis of Cotonou53, which he suggested that had overstated the coherence of the 
locking-in process.54 
 
From a more Gramscian underpinning, a number of authors55 argue that the CPA represents a 
system to encourage greater competitiveness and has a more general significance in ensuring 
wider compliance with multilateral liberalisation. They argue that EU material and ideational 
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interests within the historical context of EU-ACP relations, are represented in EU efforts to 
‘lock-in’ neo-liberalisation via EPAs, reducing their ‘policy space’ and undermining regional 
integration. 
 
We have much sympathy with these materialist and critical constructivist accounts but we seek 
to differentiate our understanding somewhat. There is much to commend in 
Bieler/Brown/Hurt/Langan’s analysis.  We share the analysis of the inherent tendency of 
capitalist social relations toward expanded reproduction.  Following Neil Smith,56 we also see 
this process of intensive and extensive expansion resulting in uneven patterns of development.  
However, we contend that development may be both uneven and combined, but that does not 
mean that U&CD explains this as a predictive law.  Further, one consequence of Bieler’s 
analysis is that there is very little difference in his interpretation of the European Commission’s 
objectives in trade negotiations from a realist/mercantilist understanding57 of the Commission 
pursuing its comparative advantage in services trade. We see it as important to once again 
assert the importance of seeing EU trade with the ACP, or developing and emerging market 
economies more generally, in the context of wider developments in trade liberalisation and 
world market expansion, leading to generalised competitiveness as opposed to merely the 
competitiveness of one state/regional bloc relative to others. 
 
The EU promotes extensive world market expansion, through EU enlargement, external trade 
liberalisation and development cooperation and the broadening and deepening of the internal 
market.  The outcome of this is that both labour and capital in the EU and its development 
‘partners’ are exposed to increased generalised competitiveness. Within that more global 
objective the EU may also try to secure a greater proportion of the surplus value produced 
globally, through advantageous external trade deals, but this is a secondary objective to world 
market expansion. It is precisely this that explains why the EU seeks trade liberalisation with 
both developed (as in for example the various other liberalisation processes e.g. Trans-Atlantic 
Trade and Investment Partnership) and developing countries at the same time as it also seeks 
internal liberalisation. New sectors (e.g. digital, legal and public services) are targeted for both 
internal and external liberalisation in the full knowledge of the effects of competition in product 
and labour markets which have already experienced liberalisation and a resulting labour market 
polarisation.  The Commission itself targets this polarisation as a high level policy problem 
(segmented labour markets, absolute and in-work poverty etc.) and acknowledges their cause 
as increased (including international) competition in these markets,58 yet it continues to pursue 
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liberalisation in sectors currently protected.59  The parallel here with pursuing trade 
liberalisation, private sector development and openness to MNCs in the global south, under the 
banner of ‘sustainable development’ and ‘inclusive growth’ is notable. 
 
Concerns with relative comparative advantage may shape the pace of liberalisation and the 
relative enthusiasm of different member states, lobby and interest groups to support the 
Commission’s stance. However, the Commission itself remains implacably in favour of 
expanding and deepening the trade regime across and within sectors, internally, and externally 
with both developed and developing economies.  Some sectional interests may hope to reap 
the benefits of U&CD but this is within an overall preference for the promotion of intensively 
and extensively expanded capitalist reproduction.  As further support for our argument, the 
Commission continues to pursue trade liberalisation with countries which have been 
remarkably successful in recent years at catch-up industrialisation and trade competition vis-à-
vis the EU, such as China.  At the same time, the competitive threat posed by China, India and 
other emerging economies is used now as the logic for efforts to increase the competitiveness 
of EU societies, in the same way as the US and Japan were a generation earlier.60  It is also a 
motivation to ensure that trade liberalisation progresses with some ACP states (e.g. Angola and 
South Africa) in the context of trade competition in these countries from China.61  In sum, we 
argue that U&CD may describe the result of trade liberalisation (and more broadly the 
combination of domestic social relations and international competition) in some sectors and 
between some places (including sub-nationally62) but it does not necessarily explain it.63 
 
For an explanation we need to locate the EU-ACP trade relationship within a multi-scalar 
process of world market expansion, driven by the twin systemic pressures of competition, and 
class struggle.64  Accordingly, while we attach importance to the universal force of 
competitiveness as a systemic property of an expanding world market, the consequences of this 
are socially and historically embedded and path dependent; resulting in myriad different hybrid 
institutional forms.  Here what Brenner/Peck et al.65 refer to as ‘variegated neo-liberalisation’ 
does not lead to simple convergence, but is characterised by the co-evolutionary variation in 
the institutional, ideological and material forms that Brown identifies, or what might be 
described as U&CD.  World market expansion must take this path dependent form for a variety 
of reasons, including the specificities of domestic class and other struggles; inter-capitalist 
competition; the ways in which these struggles are permeated with international alliances and 
divergences; and the particulars of production and pre-existing trade relationships. Rather than 
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convergence, complex processes of inter-scalar policy borrowing and experimentation66 occur 
through social struggles which sometimes seek to shape processes with tendentially universal 
characteristics – such as trade liberalisation, democratisation, environmental regulation – to 
best suit localised conditions.  National and sub-national elites seek to promote their own 
interests, sometimes with, and sometimes against transnational capital.  As Bieler67 shows, this 
may produce elite coalitions with capital and organised labour, but at other times there will be 
more scope for transnational solidarism from below.   
 
Trade liberalisation has been fully subject to these complex and dynamic struggles, unfolding 
within the context of a world market expansion that has altered the geo-politics of multi-lateral 
cooperation.  As this has led to stalling multi-lateral trade liberalisation, elites and those with 
much to gain from further liberalisation, have sought other means, and regional and sub-
regional arrangements have proliferated as a result.  In that sense, and others, policy reform for 
neo-liberalisation is not universally successful and frequently results in failure.  Far from 
halting the momentum behind neo-liberalisation though, failure is often used as a justification 
for further reform. In times of growth, it makes sense to use neo-liberalisation to ‘fix the roof 
while the sun shines’; in times of economic crisis neo-liberalisation is justified on the grounds 
that reform is then more urgently needed. When policy reform fails, it typically ‘fails forward’68 
with failure being the logic for renewed efforts to overcome barriers and opposition and to 
engage in more policy experimentation. 
 
The ongoing changes to the EU-ACP relationship represents an inter-scalar reform process 
which is likely to exhibit different path-dependent social struggles at the sub-regional, state 
and sub-state scales, within pressures for trade liberalisation and market oriented reform.  Ideas 
are significant here but only inasmuch as they emerge from material processes of social 
struggle and have material consequences, primarily in this case in relation to world market 
expansion.  As Marx and Engels69 famously argued in the 1840s, to assume that ideas have 
some life outside of material social struggles is a somewhat bizarre conclusion – and as we 
read it this is not what ‘constructivists’ argue; rather constructivism appears as the assertion 
that within processes of policy reform, ideas and the institutions that are shaped by them, 
matter.  That much we concede. However, rhetorical principles and concepts such as 
sustainable development must be located within an understanding of world market expansion 
and the contradictory processes that this realises. 
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Conclusion 
The evolution of the EPA trade regime between the EU and ACP remains characteristic of an 
attempt to ensure neo-liberalisation in the name of pro-poor and sustainable development.  This 
is a multi-scalar process that is further entrenched via the regionalisaion of the trade agenda on 
which the Cotonou reforms rest. The form of dependent development promoted by the 
‘partnership’ is pro-market in orientation and attempts to secure and deepen the embedding of 
the world market in different national ACP contexts.  This is not a simple process of 
homogenisation and policy convergence but embedding the world market in the domestic 
political economy – a process that even when subject to universal processes, most notably 
competitiveness, is always nationally specific and path dependent by necessity.  Variegation in 
the extent to which trade is liberalised between countries, between sectors and the way in which 
liberalisation or even protectionism is justified and achieved are to be expected. As it has 
evolved the EU-ACP relationship has embraced and recognised this variegation. 
 
The variegated reform that results from the EU-ACP relationship is much more expansive than 
mere trade liberalisation. It extends to social protection and other aspects of social policy and 
is veiled in the language of poverty reduction and sustainable development.  Spreading the 
ideology of market freedom at the same time as enmeshing domestic society in the web of the 
world market is part of a proletarianising strategy which is common – even in its different 
policy experiments and institutionalised forms across the different EPAs and states.  If this is 
about securing compliance with EU authored ideational frameworks for sustainable 
development, those ideas both spring from the material expansion of the world market and its 
contradictions, and have material effects – whether successful or not – in the forms of 
development that arise from them.  
 
While policy reform is not always successful, this does not mean that alternative paths to 
development open up.  Rather, restless policy experimentation is tried – in different funding 
arrangements and in different negotiating approaches between EPAs.  That trade liberalisation 
and policy reform sometimes – often even – fail or stall is merely the invitation for further 
evolution.  In the end, the EU’s attempt at sustainable development is to sustain both world 
market expansion and the processes of variegated reform that it entails by establishing the 
multi-scalar governance mechanisms, that this can operate through. These include establishing 
alliances with major international organisations around key framing concepts such as 
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sustainable development and poverty reduction, the long-term institutionalised EU-ACP 
relationship as in the CPA, sub-regional cooperation in the EPAs and ‘deep’ domestic reform 
processes too. 
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